JOHN HOWARD and George Bush tell us that the occupation of Afghanistan is bringing stability and prosperity to the region. But the experience across the border in Pakistan shows how big a lie this is.The Pakistani state, a key US ally, is being undermined by the instability created by the occupation.

The problem for Pakistan's military dictator General Pervez Musharraf is control of the country's border with Afghanistan-the so-called North West Frontier.

Musharraf can do nothing, it seems, to curb Taliban influence not only in the border areas near Afghanistan, but within key political and military bodies within Pakistan.

Armed conflict recently broke out in the border province of Waziristan. The combatants are a collection of Islamic fighters, mostly Uzbeks and some Chechens, who fled into the area in the early 1990s, as well as Taliban fighters led by Mohammad Nazir.

The foreign fighters' indifferent and sometimes brutal treatment of Wazir communities has strengthened the Taliban's hand. For example, Uzbek militants are accused of the murder of 180 Maliks (village elders).

The Pakistani army earlier tried to quell the unrest by deploying 80,000 troops to Waziristan. But, understandably, it was seen by Wazirs as an occupying force.

Musharraf turned to the Taliban to provide stability. According to The Economist, Nazir has received air and artillery support from the Pakistani army.

Such moves have the US worried. On one hand, they want to keep Pakistan within their sphere of influence.

On other hand, they know that Taliban fighters are moving across Pakistan's North West Frontier with impunity.

The last thing the US needs is Pakistan providing a base for the Taliban to regroup and attack US troops.

The need for stability in the North West provinces and Afghanistan has long dominated strategic thinking in Pakistan. Many military leaders have argued that control of Afghanistan would give Pakistan "strategic depth" in any future war with India.

In the 1980s the ISI (Pakistan's Secret Service) channelled billions of US dollars to the Mujahedeen fighting Russian forces in Afghanistan.

The CIA acted as mentor for the ISI during this period. The ISI soon became a potent force in Pakistani politics, often overriding parliament.

But Washington cut the ISI's funding at the end of the Cold War, diminishing its power.

When the Taliban rose to power in 1995, Pakistan embraced them as a means to stabilise the North Western Frontier. But the Taliban soon proved to be a difficult ally. It rapidly secured influence in Pakistani politics. Many of the Taliban came from refugee camps in Pakistan. They were educated in Pakistani madrassas (religious schools) and learnt their fighting skills from Mujahedeen based in Pakistan.

Musharraf won power following a military coup in 1999. The US responded with sanctions against the new regime.

Following 9-11, the Bush administration's regional priority was to secure new allies in its war against the Taliban. The sanctions were dropped, and Pakistan shifted overnight from a despised regime to an ally in the War on Terror. Although Musharraf continues to support the war, his government's contradictory attitude toward the Taliban has become an increasing problem for the US.

The Taliban's influence in Pakistan has been underpinned by a lucrative cross border smuggling racket known as the Afghan Transit Centre. The Taliban, the ISI and an array of commercial and trucking firms have made millions selling heroin, electrical goods, weapons and luxury items across the border.

The official Pakistani economy has been weakened by the smuggling. For example, in 1997/98 Pakistan lost $600 million in customs revenue.

Those who wanted to get rich quick made their way to the border and tried to buy themselves an administrative posting.

The corruption, narcotics trade, and violence have destabilised the state and poisoned civil society.

The instability has enabled the Taliban and other forms of radical Islamism to exploit openings within the fractured Pakistani state.

Limits of

imperialism

Musharraf's problems have been made worse by his embrace of neo-liberal economic policies, including an IMF structural adjustment program.

Underlying the ascendancy of radical Islam in Pakistan, particularly in those provinces bordering Afghanistan, are shocking levels of poverty.

Around 35 per cent of the population are desperately poor. In the North West provinces there is only one hospital bed for every 6000 inhabitants and a literacy rate of around 10 per cent.

It's not surprising that politics becomes volatile in such desperate circumstances. Part of the Taliban's appeal is the promise to restore social order, albeit through a strictly enforced interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law).

Because the government has abandoned most of its responsibility to feed and house the poor, Islamist networks have assumed the role of welfare providers.

Sometimes Islamist activists have redirected anger from genuine social issues into violence towards other religious groups. Waves of violence have shaken both urban and rural areas.

In response to the growing instability, Musharraf has used the War on Terror as an excuse to crack down on his opponents. For example, anti-terror legislation has given police the excuse to execute "criminals" and terror suspects on the spot.

The US depends upon this corrupt and incompetent government to help create the kind of stability that will advance its strategic interests.

But in many ways this dependence highlights the limitations of US imperialism. It cannot abandon Pakistan and other unstable Central Asian states, for fear of allowing Russia and China to penetrate the region.

Nor can it compel Musharraf to eradicate the Taliban and other Islamist groups that receive such high levels of popular support. Any such attempt could bring down his government.

Recently Pakistan has been wracked with demonstrations against the military regime.

These protests-combined with the resistance to occupation in Afghanistan-point a way out of a crisis, one that cannot be resolved by continued Western interventions.

By Adrian Skerritt